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INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] Technologies like digital audio, the Internet, and broadband 
communications spur economic growth and foster new patterns of 
commerce and social interaction.  But they also spawn disruptive 
innovations that force established industries to forge novel responses or 
risk falling by the wayside.1  The horse-and-buggy industry,2 vaudeville,3 
 
                                                                                                                         
*
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1
 See generally infra Parts II−III (describing how technological innovation can give rise 
to economic upheavals). 
2
 See Thomas A. Kinney, From Shop to Factory in the Industrial Heartland: The 
Industrialization of Horse-Drawn Vehicle Manufacture in the City of Cleveland (Sept. 
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and video-rental stores4 are but a few examples of thriving markets that 
found themselves on the scrap heap of obsolescence because they failed to 
react quickly to the devastating effects of new technology.5 
[2] Industries faced with such challenges often look to the law for 
help, as do new-technology upstarts that feel bullied by their entrenched 
competition.6  But legislatures and the courts have rarely done more than 
delay the inevitable.7  One reason has been the all-too-common failure of 
 
                                                                                                                         
28, 1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Case Western Reserve University), available 
at http://ech.case.edu/ech-cgi/article.pl?id=WACI (describing how none of Cleveland’s 
“enormous wagon and carriage factories” survived the introduction of the automobile). 
3
 See, e.g., West Virginia State University Capitol Center, Welcome to Capitol Center: 
History, http://capcenter.wvstateu.edu/history.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2009) (“With the 
advent of ‘talkies’ in the late ’20s, . . . live stage shows were suddenly things of the 
past.”). 
4
 See, e.g., Posting of Matt Buchanan to Gizmodo, http://gizmodo.com/ (Nov. 2, 2007, 
01:15 EST) (noting that Blockbuster is the only video-store chain to remain profitable 
and that its only hope of survival is to “[m]ov[e] into new distribution channels,” and that 
“things are looking grim for the corner rental store”). 
5
 All three industries were displaced with startling speed by new markets created by the 
automobile, the motion picture soundtrack, and Internet movie distribution.  See supra 
notes 2−4 and accompanying text. 
6
 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 417 (1984) 
(providing an example of unsuccessful petitioning of the Supreme Court to outlaw home 
video-recording); Deep v. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc., 540 U.S. 1107, 1107 
(2004); see also Declan McCullagh, High Court Turns Deaf Ear to Aimster, CNET 
NEWS, Jan. 13, 2004, http://www.news.com/2100-1028-5139938.html (discussing the 
Supreme Court’s refusal in Deep v. RIAA to hear Aimster’s argument that the online file 
sharing service had legitimate non-infringing uses). 
7
 Regardless of how the cases listed supra at note 6 were decided, none were able to halt 
the disruptive effect of new technology.  Sony could not stop the inexorable growth of 
home video-recording and none of the recording industry’s many legal victories could 
save it from decimation by online file sharing.  See generally JAMES LARDNER, FAST 
FORWARD: HOLLYWOOD, THE JAPANESE, AND THE ONSLAUGHT OF THE VCR (1st ed. 
1987) (describing the content industry’s efforts to suppress personal video-recording 
technologies); AERNOUT SCHMIDT, WILFRED DOLFSMA & WIM KEUVELAAR, FIGHTING 
THE WAR ON FILE SHARING 85−86, 90 (2007) (noting that the record industry’s successful 
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conventional legal analysis to address the irreconcilable differences 
between warring factions’ basic assumptions, beliefs, and norms of 
behavior.8  This article argues that such disparities are functionally similar 
to the “cognitive dissonances” that behavioral and social psychologists 
observe in conflicted individuals9 and synthesizes a dissonance-based 
analytical model suited to such controversies.10  It concludes that 
lawmakers and courts seeking to remedy the social ills caused by 
technological disruption should consider classical dissonance-reduction 
strategies used successfully in the social sciences.11 
[3] This article assembles this thesis in three steps.  It first synthesizes 
Thomas Kuhn’s observations about paradigm shifts12 with modern 
economic and business management theories to create a general model of 
the large-scale social and economic disruption that accompanies 
technological innovation.13  Next, it draws upon principles of behavioral 
and social psychology to find parallels between internal conflicts (or 
“cognitive dissonances”) experienced by individuals and those that arise 
within communities on either side of a paradigm shift.14  Finally, it asserts 
that lawmakers, regulators, and the courts must consider the effect of such 
 
                                                                                                                         
effort to shut down the centralized Napster network merely encouraged file sharing 
entrepreneurs to develop more resilient decentralized topologies such as Gnutella). 
8
 See infra Part VII.A. 
9
 See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (Stanford 
University Press 1957) (deriving the basic precepts of cognitive dissonance theory). 
10
 See infra Parts V −VI. 
11
 See infra Part VII.B. 
12
 See infra note 18. 
13
 See infra Part II. 
14
 See infra Parts III−V. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology  Volume XVI, Issue 1 
4 
dissonances when devising legal remedies to controversies created by 
disruptive innovation.15 
[4] Part II of this article lays the groundwork for this argument by 
introducing the concept of shared paradigms and describing how a 
technology-driven shift to a new paradigm advances scientific and social 
progress even as it devastates established markets.  Part III calls upon 
evolutionary economic theory to describe the Darwinian process that links 
these shifts to disruptive technological innovation.  Part IV surveys 
cognitive dissonance theory, which psychologists have traditionally used 
to predict and explain the ways individuals respond to conflicts among 
their personal beliefs, assumptions, and behavioral norms.  Part V ties 
everything together into a unified theory of paradigmatic dissonance that 
extends cognitive dissonance doctrine to the thorny controversies that 
arise when disruptive technology spawns a community whose members 
share an  unprecedented paradigm or business model.  Part VI integrates 
this model into modern jurisprudential thought, specifically linking the 
precepts of behavioral psychology to the neoclassical principles framing 
the Law and Economics movement.  Part VII applies paradigmatic 
dissonance to our legal system, comparing it to conventional Rationalist 
approaches and using it to suggest more effective ways to analyze and 
remedy disputes rooted in disruptive technological innovation. 
I.  SETTING THE STAGE 
[5] Markets come and markets go; history is littered with the cadavers 
of once-healthy industries that failed to react quickly enough to new 
technology.16  Consider, for example, the way that markets rose and fell as 
waves of innovation drove consumers from live burlesque to radio, to free 
over-the-air television, and then to various flavors of subscription TV.  
Repeatedly, industries and the cultures they feed have been unseated by 
newer technologies that better met the needs of consumers.  The survivors 
 
                                                                                                                         
15
 See infra Part VII. 
16
 See, e.g., supra notes 2−5 and accompanying text. 
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are those nimble enough to devise business models that successfully 
exploit new technologies.17 
[6] Despite the painful ramifications for established industries, this 
quasi-evolutionary process of stability, disruption, adaptation, and renewal 
ultimately is beneficial to society.18  Technology that fosters more 
efficient and flexible ways of working, playing, communicating, or 
transacting business serves the public good and is essential for survival in 
a global economy.19  Like a fire that clears deadwood, periodic exfoliation 
is an efficient way to revitalize stagnating markets.20 
 
                                                                                                                         
17
 Consider the motion picture industry, which has survived for nearly a century by 
maintaining the flexibility to extract revenue from potentially disruptive technologies 
ranging from sound recording to broadcast television, the VCR, cable TV, and the 
Internet.  See generally A CONCISE HANDBOOK OF MOVIE INDUSTRY ECONOMICS 
(Charles C. Moul ed., 2005); THE AMERICAN MOVIE INDUSTRY: THE BUSINESS OF 
MOTION PICTURES (Gorham Kindem ed., 1982). 
18
 See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 66, 97−98 (2d ed. 
1970); JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 83−84 
(Harper & Row 1976) (1942); Aron S. Spencer & Bruce A. Kirchhoff, Schumpeter and 
New Technology Based Firms: Towards a Framework for How NTBFs Cause Creative 
Destruction, 2 INT’L ENTREPRENEURSHIP & MGMT. J. 145, 146 (2006). 
19
 See Spencer & Kirchhoff, supra note 18, at 146. 
20
 Contrast this to the case where industries have survived by anticipating and riding each 
new wave of innovation as it breaks.  In such cases, businesses are able to prevent 
paradigm shifts by incorporating non-disruptive sustaining technologies into their 
business models.  See CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN 
NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL xviii−xix (HarperBusiness 2000) 
(1997) (describing the differences between disruptive and sustaining technologies).  In 
the rewritable-DVD industry, tier one manufacturers survived for years by exploiting 
every technological advance in the medium with a new product line.  Each generation 
commanded higher margins long enough to subsidize R&D costs, and by the time 
offshore vendors could drive down prices with reverse-engineered knockoffs, the next 
launch was ready to go.  This cyclical model kept the industry healthy until it finally hit 
the physical limits of the medium.  Similar business models are common in the computer 
and consumer electronics industries.  See, e.g., Don Labriola, Discs After DVD: Blue-
Light Specials, PC MAGAZINE, May 18, 2005, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0, 
2704,1820927,00.asp. 
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[7] The situation is less clear-cut when a business is inundated by a 
technological tsunami that it fails to predict.  Laws that do no more than 
prop up inundated businesses paddle against an inexorable current.21  
There were certainly good reasons, for example, to give the record 
industry legal tools to defend itself against the unauthorized online 
distribution of its assets.22  But lawmakers and the courts might have 
better served the major labels by considering the bigger picture.23  As 
important as it is to protect intellectual property rights, statutes enacted or 
applied in response to technological disruption must consider the 
overarching natural selection process that ensures our economy’s 
continued vitality.24  The laws of the wild are harsh, but established 
industries sometimes benefit when forced to fend for themselves against 
new business models.25  The challenge for lawmakers and adjudicators is 
to balance the legal rights of traditional businesses against the survival of 
 
                                                                                                                         
21
 The theorists discussed in Parts II−IV are unanimous in their contention that these 
types of technology-driven mass migrations, once begun, cannot be stopped for long.  
See, e.g., infra notes 45, 60. 
22
 See, e.g., Brief of Ass’n for Independent Music as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Appellees at 3−7, A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(No. 00-16401), 2000 WL 33979744. 
23
 See, e.g., Brian Hiatt & Evan Serpick, The Record Industry’s Decline: Record Sales 
Are Tanking, and There’s No Hope in Sight: How It All Went Wrong, ROLLING STONE, 
June 28, 2007, 
http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/15137581/the_record_industrys_decline/ 
(stating that, like many industry insiders, talent management company CEO Jeff 
Kwatinetz now believes that suing Napster “was the moment that the labels killed 
themselves”). 
24
 This process will be described from several perspectives infra in Parts II−V, and its 
application to legal controversies discussed infra in Parts VI.A and VII.B. 
25
 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 446 (1984), 
where the Supreme Court’s refusal to outlaw videocassette recorders forced the movie 
industry to figure out how to instead use the technology to create a profitable aftermarket; 
see also LARDNER, supra note 7. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology  Volume XVI, Issue 1 
7 
pioneers who leverage new technology into more efficient (and often 
unforeseeable) markets—a task akin to playing chess blindfolded.26 
II.  SHIFTING PARADIGMS 
A.  THE ELUSIVE PARADIGM 
[8] Hand-waving marketeers and pop-culture theorists have long used 
the word “paradigm” as a linguistic spittoon, plugging it with any meaning 
that happened to need a receptacle at the moment.27  If defined with 
precision, however, the concept of shared paradigms can be an effective 
way to characterize and understand cultural and economic transitions. 
[9] The current meaning of the word “paradigm” emerged in the 
natural sciences with the publication of epistemologist28 and science 
historian Thomas Kuhn’s influential 1962 essay “The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions.”29  Kuhn described a prototypical shared paradigm 
that he conceptualized as a “disciplinary matrix” of beliefs and practices 
that define a scientific discipline.30  Kuhn’s “disciplinary matrix” concept 
 
                                                                                                                         
26
 See infra Part VII.B.2.f (describing how new business models are intrinsically 
unpredictable). 
27
 See ROBERT LAWRENCE TRASK, MIND THE GAFFE! A TROUBLESHOOTER’S GUIDE TO 
ENGLISH STYLE AND USAGE 200 (2006) (“[P]aradigm has become a vogue word, and 
today it is used far too freely, and often pretentiously, when a simpler word would be 
preferable. . . . Moreover, be very wary of the expression paradigm shift.  This term . . . 
has been . . . applied with wearisome frequency to almost any change in policy or 
fashion.”). 
28
 Epistemology is a branch of philosophy that studies the nature of knowledge, its means 
of production, and the way that it relates to concepts like truth, belief, and skepticism.  
See Britannica Online Encyclopedia, Epistemology (Philosophy), 
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9106052/epistemology (last visited Oct. 12, 2009). 
29
 See KUHN, supra note 18. 
30
 Id. at 182.  Kuhn initially defined the term as “the entire constellation of beliefs, 
values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community.”  Id. at 175.  
But he later described a narrower type of “paradigm” that was a subset of the disciplinary 
matrix: “the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can 
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remains useful today in the natural sciences and does not differ 
fundamentally from the modern understanding of a scientific “paradigm” 
as a “set of assumptions, models[,] and methods that serves as common, 
almost canonic knowledge in a discipline.”31 
[10] Kuhn confined his work to scientific communities, but he was 
quick to note that it could legitimately be extended to other fields,32 a 
prediction long since fulfilled in disciplines ranging from sociology33 to 
management science34 and information technology.35  The concept, 
however, has not always survived translation, often suffering arbitrary 
 
                                                                                                                         
replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal 
science.”  Id.  This article will use only the original “disciplinary matrix” definition when 
referring to Kuhnian paradigms. 
31
 SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 7, at 147 n.33. 
32
 KUHN, supra note 18, at 208−09 (explicitly calling for “comparative study of the 
corresponding communities in other fields” and observing that his “theses are 
undoubtedly of wide applicability” because Kuhn himself had borrowed many 
assumptions from the social sciences, literature, music, the arts, politics, and other 
disciplines). 
33
 See, e.g., Leonard B. Bliss, J.C. Greene’s Methods in Social Inquiry, 2 J. MIXED 
METHODS RESEARCH 190, 191 (2008) (book review) (crediting the late University of 
Toronto Sociology Professor Madan Handa as having introduced the notion of social 
paradigm in the context of social sciences in his unpublished paper, Peace Paradigm: 
Transcending Liberal and Marxian Paradigms, presented at International Symposium on 
Science, Technology and Development (Mar. 20−25, 1987) (mimeographed transcript 
available in the O.I.S.E. Library, Univ. of Toronto)). 
34
 See, e.g., Jason Withrow & Mark Geljon, Paradigm Dissonance: A Significant Factor 
in Design and Business Problems, BOXES AND ARROWS, Dec. 11, 2003, http://www. 
boxesandarrows.com/view/paradigm_dissonance_a_significant_factor_in_design_and_bu
siness_problems. 
35
 See, e.g., PCMag.com Encyclopedia, Paradigm Shift Definition, 
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,,t=paradigm+shift&i=57310,00.asp (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2009) (claiming that one example of a “paradigm shift” is “accessing 
applications and data from the Web instead of from local servers”). 
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redefinition.36  This article will use the term “paradigm” conservatively to 
describe a collection of assumptions, beliefs, and norms of behavior that 
(i) are specific to an industry, customer base, or other clearly demarcated 
community and (ii) shape the way that such a community conducts itself 
and perceives the world.  This approach is faithful both to Kuhn’s original 
concept and to current usage,37 yet broad enough to be applied with 
precision to non-scientific communities and markets associated with 
specific technologies.38 
B.  PARADIGM SHIFTS 
[11] Kuhn likened a paradigm to a scientific community’s blueprint for 
solving problems, calling experimental work done within an established 
paradigm “normal science.”39  Unlike traditional notions of scientific 
progress as a linear, incremental process that occurs within a static 
universe, Kuhn observed that the most important leaps take place when 
normalcy is interrupted by anomalies40 that cannot be accommodated by 
 
                                                                                                                         
36
 The computer industry, for example, defines “paradigm” broadly as any “model, 
example or pattern,” PCMag.com Encyclopedia, Paradigm Definition, 
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=paradigm&i=48811,00.asp (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2009), a characterization that has encouraged pundits to apply it to 
everything from user-interface styles, Jan Ozer, Pinnacle Edition DV, PC MAGAZINE, 
Sep. 17, 2002, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,480618,00.asp, to the way that 
Microsoft Word structures documents, Edward Mendelson, The Best Office Alternatives, 
PC MAGAZINE, Nov. 26, 2007, available at http://www.pcmag. 
com/print_article2/0,1217,a=220175,00.asp. 
37The American Heritage Dictionary defines “paradigm” as “[a] set of assumptions, 
concepts, values, and practices that constitutes a way of viewing reality for the 
community that shares them, especially in an intellectual discipline.” Dictionary.com, 
Paradigm Definition, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/paradigm (last visited Oct. 
14, 2009). 
38
 See, e.g., infra Part VII.C. 
39
 KUHN, supra note 14, at 10, 24. 
40
 An anomaly in this context is a discovery with implications that contradict the 
assumptions and beliefs of the current paradigm, or that render that paradigm’s norms of 
behavior ineffective or inadequate.  Id. at 52−53. 
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the prevailing paradigm.41  He dubbed such an event a “crisis.”42  In 
extreme cases, which he later called “paradigm shifts,”43 a community in 
crisis undergoes a scientific revolution that compels it to adopt an entirely 
new paradigm that better fits the troublesome data.44  When this occurs, it 
is impossible for the old and new paradigms to coexist.45  Kuhn called this 
characteristic “incommensurability,” stating that profound differences in 
the ways that such overlapping worldviews interpret basic definitions and 
standards make it impossible even to compare, much less to reconcile 
them.46 
 
                                                                                                                         
41
 Kuhn gave an example of such a crisis in nineteenth century optical physics, when 
mounting evidence that a beam of light could act like a stream of particles could not be 
explained by assumptions intrinsic to the prevailing paradigm of the wave theory of light.  
This crisis was resolved only when the scientific community shifted over the next half-
century to a relativistic paradigm that could account for this evidence.  Id. at 11−13, 
107−08.  This example also illustrates Kuhn’s observation that paradigm shifts can take 
decades to complete and often require the death or retirement of most of the community 
members who had vested emotionally in the earlier paradigm.  Id. at 150−52. 
42
 Id. at 66−73 (repeatedly referring to several such incidents as “crises”). 
43
 Id. at 103−06 (first using the term “paradigm shift” several times in the Postscript to 
the Enlarged Second Edition). 
44
 Id. at 84−85. 
45
 Id. at 98 (declaring it an “historical implausibility” that a new scientific theory or 
paradigm could arise without discrediting and displacing its predecessor). 
46
 See id. at 149 (observing that a new paradigm, although likely to borrow vocabulary, 
concepts, and procedures from the traditional worldview it replaces, “seldom employ[s 
them in] the traditional way”); see also id. at 150 (stating that “the proponents of the 
competing paradigms practice their trades in different worlds,” meaning that differences 
in basic assumptions change the way that old- and new-paradigm communities perceive 
common aspects of reality); cf. id. at 101−02 (citing as an example the 
incommensurability of Newtonian and Einsteinian mechanics, where even seemingly 
equivalent terms like “mass” have fundamentally different meanings). 
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[12] Nonetheless, Kuhn considered paradigm shifts to be an essential 
catalyst of scientific progress47 that “invariably” result in the advancement 
of science.48  He described them as part of an evolutionary process that 
naturally selects the worldview that best explains both anomalous 
observations and the greatest number of phenomena that fall within the 
traditional model.49  Such a mechanism, he argued, may not foster a model 
that is objectively “closer to the truth,”50 but it cannot possibly result in 
anything other than progress.51 
[13] Kuhn also observed that the mere discovery of an anomaly does 
not always trigger a paradigm shift.52  If a troubling observation does not 
essentially conflict with a fundamental component of a traditional 
paradigm, a community may find some way to accommodate the anomaly 
by applying traditional paradigms in new ways or by redefining the 
troublesome observation to fall within some other discipline.53  The 
 
                                                                                                                         
47
 Id. at 77 (summarizing the prior chapter with the assumption that scientific “crises are a 
necessary precondition for the emergence of novel theories”). 
48
 Id. at 173 (“[P]aradigm change invariably produce[s] an instrument more perfect . . . 
than those known before[.]”). 
49
 Id. at 109−10 (presenting paradigm shifts as a natural selection process that fosters 
competition among worldviews to best explain anomalies that thwarted the old 
paradigm); id. at 172 (drawing explicit parallels between scientific progress and Darwin’s 
theory of biological “evolution”).  Kuhn also noted that, at least in the field of 
mathematics, new paradigms often represent a step forward because they are likely to 
provide “neater” or “simpler” solutions than the paradigms they replace.  Id. at 155−56. 
50
 Id. at 148−51 (arguing that the principle of incommensurability made such a claim 
impossible to measure). 
51
 Id. at 172−73. 
52
 Id. at 84 (explaining that a paradigm shift becomes inevitable only when a traditional 
paradigm is totally unable to explain a fundamentally troubling anomaly and asserting 
that a scientific community may approach the problem by i) devising creative ways to 
explain the anomaly within the current paradigm, ii) declaring the anomaly inexplicable 
at the current state-of-the-art and reserving it for analysis by future generations, or iii) 
migrating to a new paradigm that can explain the anomaly). 
53
 Id. 
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community may even completely sidestep the problem by declaring it 
beyond the current state-of-the-art and setting it aside for consideration by 
future researchers armed with next-generation clinical tools.54 
III.  CREATIVE DESTRUCTION AND DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION 
[14] Despite their disparate vantage points, Kuhn’s analysis of 
paradigm dynamics has much in common with the evolutionary school of 
economics.  Both view technological innovation and its effects as an 
inevitable, adaptive, even quasi-organic, process akin to natural 
selection.55  And like Kuhn, evolutionary economists believe that, despite 
the havoc that a paradigm shift wreaks upon a traditional community, such 
transitions are a prerequisite for progress.56  This school has become an 
integral part of modern macroeconomic theory.57 
 
                                                                                                                         
54
 Id. 
55
 Economist.com, Economics A−Z http://www.economist.com/research/Economics/ 
alphabetic.cfm?letter=E#evolutionaryeconomics (last visited Oct. 14, 2009).  
“Evolutionary economics” is defined as “[a] Darwinian approach to [economics] . . . .  
Following the tradition of S[chumpeter], it views the economy as an evolving system and 
places a strong emphasis on dynamics, changing structures (including technologies, 
institutions, beliefs and behaviour) and [disequilibrium] processes (such as [innovation], 
selection and imitation).”  Id.; see also Richard R. Nelson, Recent Evolutionary 
Theorizing About Economic Change, 33 J. ECON. LITERATURE 48, 49 (1995) (noting that 
Darwinian analogies come naturally to economists, who often “make use of ‘biological 
conceptions’ or metaphors” when speaking colloquially about their work). 
56
 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 18; ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE SOCIAL SCIENCE VIEW 14 
(Richard Swedberg ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2000). 
57
 The pioneering work of the evolutionary economists discussed here has been 
acknowledged by numerous authorities and has earned them several Nobel Prizes.  See, 
e.g., The Bernard Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis, http://homepage. 
newschool.edu/het//profiles/solow.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2009) (“Robert Solow is one 
of the major figures of the Neo-Keynesian Synthesis macroeconomics.”); All Laureates 
in Economics, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/ economics/laureates (last visited Oct. 
14, 2009) (listing evolutionary economist Paul Samuelson’s 1970 Nobel Prize “for the 
scientific work through which he has developed static and dynamic economic theory and 
actively contributed to raising the level of analysis in economic science” and Solow’s 
1987 Nobel Prize “for his contributions to the theory of economic growth”). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology  Volume XVI, Issue 1 
13 
A.  SCHUMPETER AND SELF-DESTRUCTING CAPITALISM 
[15] Joseph Schumpeter’s analysis of the role of entrepreneurship 
profoundly influenced twentieth-century economic thought.58  In his 
posthumous 1954 book The History of Economic Analysis, he described a 
cyclical model of “creative destruction” that ties closed-universe economic 
development to endlessly recurring sequences of equilibrium, disruption, 
transition/adaptation, and renewed stability.59  He portrayed capitalism as 
a self-devouring process of monopoly and breakup, where technology-
driven entrepreneurship continually and inexorably interrupts the “steady-
state” economic equilibrium that normally exists in the absence of 
entrepreneurial perturbation.60 
[16] In Schumpeter’s view, this “creative destruction” was an essential 
component of capitalism that was responsible for economic growth.61  
Like Kuhn, his observations lead to the conclusion that governments 
should avoid unduly hampering technological progress by seeking too 
zealously to shield traditional industries from its disruptive effects.62 
B.  TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND THE  
SOLOW-SWAN NEOCLASSICAL MODEL 
 
                                                                                                                         
58
 For a compelling biography of Schumpeter, who is often named one of the founding 
fathers of evolutionary economic theory, see THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHET OF 
INNOVATION: JOSEPH SCHUMPETER AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION (2007). 
59
 See SCHUMPETER, supra note 18, at 83. 
60
 Id.; see also JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN 
INQUIRY INTO PROFITS, CAPITAL, CREDIT, INTEREST, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 66−67 
(Oxford Univ. Press 1978) (1934) (describing capitalism’s “competitive destruction of 
the old” and enumerating the five classes of disruptive innovations that entrepreneurs 
introduce into steady-state systems). 
61
 SCHUMPETER, supra note 18, at 84. 
62
 The assertions that paradigm shifts are a vital component of scientific or economic 
progress and that blindly interfering with them can lead to unintended consequences are 
common threads that span the breadth of this article.  See generally Parts II−VI. 
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[17] Robert Solow and Trevor Swan refined and quantified 
Schumpeter’s work and developed the Solow-Swan Neoclassical model of 
economic growth.63  This theory states that overall economic progress 
within a Schumpeterian closed system is driven solely by (i) increases in 
“inputs” (primarily labor and capital) and (ii) exogenous technical 
progress.64  It concludes that economies naturally converge toward a 
steady-state growth rate that depends upon the pace of technological 
progress and changes in the size of the labor force.65  If the workforce 
increases at a steady, predictable rate, then overall economic growth 
(adjusting for factors like depreciation and inflation) becomes a function 
of the pace of technological innovation.66  This model has since been 
applied to determine that eighty percent of post-World War II growth in 
domestic productivity was due primarily to global research and 
development.67 
 
                                                                                                                         
63
 See WARREN J. SAMUELS ET AL., A COMPANION TO THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC 
THOUGHT 413−14 (2003).  See generally Robert Solow, A Contribution to the Theory of 
Economic Growth, 70 Q.J. ECON. 65 (1956) (introducing the author’s theory in full 
quantification); Trevor W. Swan, Economic Growth and Capital Accumulation, 32 ECON. 
REC. 334 (1956) (presenting an elaboration of Swan’s initial presentation of what would 
become his neoclassical growth theory). 
64
 See SAMUELS ET AL., supra note 63, at 413−14 (citing the Neoclassical Model’s 
“golden rule” for economic growth, which holds that rate of return on capital investments 
depends solely on “the rate of growth of the labor force, the rate of technical progress, 
and the rate of depreciation”). 
65
 See id. 
66
 See id. 
67
 Charles I. Jones, Sources of U.S. Economic Growth in a World of Ideas, 92 AM. ECON. 
REV. 220, 234-35 (2002) (using the Solow model to determine that eighty percent of 
domestic economic growth from 1950 to 1993 was due to increases in educational 
attainment and world R&D levels). 
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C.  CHRISTENSEN AND DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION 
[18] These theories burst into mainstream consciousness when Harvard 
Business School professor Clayton Christensen’s best-selling 1997 book, 
The Innovator’s Dilemma, introduced a theory of business management 
that addressed the destabilizing market effects of “disruptive 
technologies.”68  Unlike “sustaining technologies,” which generally are 
incorporated into existing business models, Christensen’s disruptive 
technologies spawn new markets that small, innovative companies can 
hijack from under the noses of established businesses.69  He stated that 
such technologies, so long as they are sufficiently different from 
traditional models, would displace even clearly superior alternatives if 
they better fit the needs of an emerging (and overlooked) user 
community.70  The new markets are often too small to attract the attention 
of established interests initially, but they can grow rapidly enough to 
displace entire industries71 through a natural selection process much like a 
Kuhnian paradigm shift or Schumpeter’s creative destruction. 
[19] Christensen ultimately revised his theory to identify “disruptive 
innovation” as the true catalyst, arguing that the novel application of 
technology within a new business model, rather than the technology itself, 
is the cause of market disruption.72 
 
                                                                                                                         
68
 See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 20, at xxii−xxviii (describing the general principles and 
characteristics of disruptive innovations); id. at 111−14 (summarizing the author’s 
suggestions for managing disruptive change). 
69
 Id. at xviii−xx. 
70
 Id. at 219−21. 
71
 Id. at 265−66. 
72
 Christensen’s The Innovator’s Solution (the sequel to The Innovator’s Dilemma) 
generally substitutes the phrase “disruptive innovation” for “disruptive technology.”  
CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S SOLUTION (2003); see also The 
Opportunity and Threat of Disruptive Technologies (CD-ROM, Harvard Bus. Sch. Publ’g 
2003) (presenting a 62-minute video lecture during which Christensen tells how Intel 
CEO Andy Grove suggested the terminology change just as The Innovator’s Solution was 
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IV.  DISSONANCE AND COGNITION 
A.  FESTINGER AND COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 
[20] Business and economic theories that describe the mechanics and 
implications of paradigm shifts do not explain why the appearance of even 
a single anomaly would drive a community to desert long-held beliefs and 
norms.  Is there some fundamental aspect of human nature that compels 
groups to abandon a worldview en masse whenever an ostensibly fitter 
one comes along?  Are lawmakers’ efforts to shield traditional business 
models from new technology invariably doomed to failure?  More to the 
point, given the historical consensus that paradigm shifts are an essential 
and indispensible condition of economic progress, is such a goal even 
desirable? 
[21] One set of answers can be found in cognitive dissonance theory, a 
branch of social psychology that describes the ways that conflicted 
individuals respond to internal contradictions.73 
[22] Dissonance theory may be virgin territory to the legal profession, 
but it is well-tread ground in the social sciences.  Current thinking dates 
back to psychologist Leon Festinger’s seminal 1957 text, A Theory of 
Cognitive Dissonance, which revealed the surprising findings of his 
clinical research into the motivations of behavior.74 
[23] Festinger defined “cognitions” as “any type of human knowledge, 
opinion, or belief about the environment, about oneself, or about one’s 
 
                                                                                                                         
going to press), available at http://www.viddler.com/explore/sleibson/videos/3/# (17-
minute excerpt). 
73
 The Encyclopedia Britannica states that “cognitive dissonance” explains why people 
seek to preserve their current understanding of the world by “reject[ing], explain[ing] 
away, or avoid[ing] the [challenging] information” or by convincing themselves that no 
conflict really exists.  Britannica Online Encyclopedia, Cognitive Dissonance 
(Psychology, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/124498/cognitive-dissonance 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2009). 
74
 FESTINGER, supra note 9. 
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behavior”75—a kitchen-sink classification that accommodates everything 
from religious and political ideologies to Internet file-sharers’ beliefs 
about the morality of their downloading practices.  Within this model, a 
shared paradigm (that is, is a collective set of assumptions, beliefs, and 
behavioral norms) is merely a set of cognitions held by all members of a 
community.76 
[24] Festinger found “cognitive dissonance” when an individual is 
faced with two cognitions that lead to obverse results.77  A record buyer, 
for example, might believe that shoplifting a CD would be an act of 
theft—a cognition that leads to the conclusion that acquiring a commercial 
recording without payment is immoral.  But if that same person falls into 
the habit of downloading copyrighted music from unauthorized Internet 
services, that behavior leads to a second cognition that spawns the obverse 
conclusion that he is allowed to take commercially produced music for 
free.  The tension between those two conclusions is a classic example of 
cognitive dissonance between a belief and a norm of behavior.78 
[25] Festinger frequently saw his subjects struggling to avoid the 
obverse implications of their dissonant cognitions, an observation that led 
him to conclude that dissonance is profoundly aversive.79  He also 
 
                                                                                                                         
75
 Id. at 3. 
76
 See supra notes 37−38 and accompanying text. 
77
 JOEL COOPER, COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: FIFTY YEARS OF A CLASSIC THEORY 6 (2007) 
(“The state of cognitive dissonance occurs when people believe that two of their 
psychological representations are inconsistent with each other.  More formally, a pair of 
cognitions is inconsistent if one cognition follows from the obverse (opposite) of the 
other.”). 
78
 See FESTINGER, supra note 9, at 5. 
79
 See COOPER, supra note 77, at 2−3 (“Festinger . . . made a very basic observation about 
. . . human beings: we do not like inconsistency.  It upsets us and drives us to action to 
reduce our inconsistency. . . .  People do not just prefer consistency over inconsistency. . . 
.  [They] are driven to resolve that inconsistency.  How we go about dealing with our 
inconsistency can be rather ingenious.  But, in Festinger’s view, there is little question 
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discovered that cognitive dissonances could be assigned magnitudes and 
that a dissonance’s aversive effect increases monotonically with its 
magnitude80—a key finding that has helped psychologists predict 
responses to dissonance-altering stimuli.81 
[26] Festinger’s basic premises remain valid today, but fifty years of 
analysis and observation have produced refinements.82  Joel Cooper’s 
“New Look” model83 asserts that dissonance produces aversion only when 
a subject deliberately takes steps to produce obverse conclusions and is 
fully aware of the consequences of that decision.  Furthermore, the extent 
of this volition and commitment is now considered a key factor in 
determining the magnitude of a dissonance and its resulting aversive 
effect.84 
 
                                                                                                                         
that it will be done.”).  In layman’s terms, this aversion is most often described as a 
nagging “discomfort” with the conflict that creates the dissonance.  Id. at 57. 
80
 Id. at 7 (noting that one distinguishing characteristic of Festinger’s theory was that it 
assigned magnitude to cognitive dissonance that was proportional to, among other things, 
the severity of contradiction between the conclusions that arise from the cognitive pair). 
81
 See JACK W. BREHM & ARTHUR R. COHEN, EXPLORATIONS IN COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 
302−06 (1962) (summarizing factors that contributed to clinically observed dissonance 
magnitudes and that indirectly determined how subjects responded to stimuli). 
82
 See COOPER, supra note 77, at 181−83 (summarizing advances in the field that have 
occurred since Festinger’s initial publication). 
83
 Id. at 182 (formalizing the “New Look” definition of dissonance as “a state of arousal 
that occurs when a person acts responsibly to bring about an unwanted consequence”) 
(emphasis added).  Note that Cooper’s model merely synthesizes concepts that have long 
been part of cognitive dissonance theory.  Brehm and Cohen, for example, theorized in 
1962 that a behavioral cognition gives rise to dissonance only when a subject acts with 
volition and commitment to the resulting obverse outcome.  See BREHM & COHEN, supra 
note 81, at 300. 
84
 COOPER, supra note 77, at 63−64. 
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B.  DISSONANCE REDUCTION 
[27] Festinger’s observation that aversion increases with dissonance 
magnitude implies that individuals, regardless of whether they act alone or 
as part of a community, are compelled to find ways to reduce the 
magnitude of any cognitive dissonance they experience.85 
[28] Festinger and his followers have documented many ways humans 
try to reduce cognitive dissonance,86 the majority of which fall into four 
general categories:87 
(i)  pretending that the dissonance does not exist; 
(ii)  reducing the dissonance’s perceived importance by 
rationalizing or discounting its effect or by 
 
                                                                                                                         
85
 Id. at 7. 
86
 Recent research suggests that the compulsion to reduce cognitive dissonance extend 
even beyond the human race.  Researchers at Yale observed capuchin monkeys subjected 
to a variation of Festinger’s original 1956 experiments exhibiting what could be 
considered dissonance-reduction behavior.  John Tierney, Go Ahead, Rationalize.  
Monkeys Do It Too., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/06/ 
science/06tier.html. 
87
 Theorists have at times organized dissonance-reduction strategies in other ways.  
Brehm & Cohen, for example, found five modes: 
• Attitude changes, which may include alterations of one’s opinions 
(personal beliefs) and of one’s evaluations (judgments); 
• Selective exposure to information; 
• Selective recall of information; 
• Perceptual distortions; and 
• Behavioral changes.   
BREHM & COHEN, supra note 81, at 306−08. 
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fabricating counter-beliefs that are consonant with 
both cognitions; 
(iii)  changing one’s behavioral norms to reduce 
dissonance with another cognition; and 
(iv)  taking steps to prevent dissonant cognitions from 
arising in the first place, including avoiding possible 
sources of dissonance-producing cognitions.88 
[29] These responses can produce unexpected and seemingly irrational 
results that, without an appreciation of dissonance effects, appear to defy 
logic.89 
V.  TYING IT ALL TOGETHER: THE DISSONANT PARADIGM MODEL 
[30] Cognitive dissonance pervades our lives, and academic literature is 
filled with efforts to extend its precepts and observations to group 
behavior.90  This article strides even further by applying the theory to 
 
                                                                                                                         
88
 COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: PROGRESS ON A PIVOTAL THEORY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
4−5 (Eddie Harmon-Jones & Judson Mills eds., 1999); see also COOPER, supra note 77, 
at 7−12 (including an example of how dissonance effects come into play when buying a 
car). 
89
 Infra Part VII.C (explaining how unexpected consequences can occur when seemingly 
straightforward attempts to change behavior run afoul of cognitive dissonance effects). 
90
 BREHM & COHEN, supra note 81, at vii (noting that from the outset, Festinger’s theory 
was used to study “a broad range of phenomena, [including] social interaction and mass 
behavior”); see, e.g., Sendhil Mullainathan & Ebonya L. Washington, Sticking with Your 
Vote: Cognitive Dissonance and Voting (Yale Econ. Applications and Policy Discussion 
Paper, Working Paper No. 14, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=904000  
(“[T]heories of cognitive dissonance suggest [that] the very act of voting may influence 
political attitudes.”); Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some 
Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1601(2006) (using 
cognitive psychology to analyze the decision-making behavior of prosecutors); Withrow 
& Geljon, supra note 34 (applying cognitive dissonance to business-management 
controversies); Victor Ricciardi & Helen K. Simon, What Is Behavioral Finance?, 2 BUS. 
EDUC. & TECH. J. 1 (2000) (surveying the field of behavioral economics known as 
behavioral finance, which applies dissonance theory to the actions and norms of investors 
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dissonances between cognitions held by communities that straddle a 
paradigm shift.91 
[31] It should not be surprising that the laws of cognitive psychology 
would apply to mass phenomena like paradigm shifts.  Communities 
consist of individuals; paradigms are, by definition, clusters of beliefs, 
assumptions, and behavioral norms (that is, cognitions) shared by 
community members.92  If a disruptive event gives rise to cognitions 
dissonant with those of a communal paradigm, similar cognitive 
dissonance potentially will confront every individual in the group.  Such a 
stimulus can, in the aggregate, produce macroeconomic effects if it elicits 
common dissonance-reduction responses from a significant proportion of 
the community.93 
[32] Kuhn, Schumpeter, Christensen, and their followers all use local 
terminology to describe aspects of this process.  An anomaly, be it an 
inexplicable experimental observation (that is, a Kuhnian “crisis”), an 
economy-shattering social or technological innovation, or an 
 
                                                                                                                         
and financial markets); William H. Cummings & M. Venkatesan, Cognitive Dissonance 
and Consumer Behavior: A Review of the Evidence, 13 J. MARKETING RES. 303 (1976) 
(reviewing and summarizing research relating consumer behaviors like brand loyalty to 
cognitive dissonance theory); BREHM & COHEN, supra note 81, at 270−85 (using 
cognitive dissonance theory to interpret the results of 1960s-era desegregation efforts); id. 
at 286−97 (applying dissonance theory to analyze brainwashing techniques used on 
Korean War POWs); Desmond Ng, Cognitive Dissonance in the Swine Value Chain (text 
of presentation made at the Banff Pork Seminar January), 12 ADVANCES IN PORK 
PRODUCTION 105 (2001), available at http://www.banffpork.ca/proc/2001pdf/Chap15-
Ng.pdf (using cognitive dissonance to explain differences in perceptions among 
competitors and end-users in the U.S. and Canadian markets for swine genetic products). 
91
 The scope of the model described here is limited to controversies that occur within a 
paradigm shift, but the author contends that it is applicable to any controversy where 
adversaries, whether individuals or groups, hail from communities within different 
paradigms, and he plans to explore this proposition in future articles. 
92
 KUHN, supra note 18, at 176 (“A paradigm is what members of a community share, 
and, conversely, a scientific community consists of men who share a paradigm.”). 
93
 Id. 
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entrepreneurial business model that renders established industries 
obsolete, destabilizes a traditional paradigm by creating cognitive 
dissonance in the minds of individuals who share that paradigm.94 
[33] Community members seek to reduce such dissonance with an 
urgency that increases with the magnitude of the dissonance.95  These 
efforts manifest as combinations of the standard dissonance-reduction 
strategies previously discussed.96  Minor dissonances may be 
accommodated without drastic steps, but anomalies that strike to the heart 
of a shared paradigm drive a community to more extreme action.97 
 
                                                                                                                         
94
 The parallels among these theories run deeper than this, but addressing them as 
comprehensively as they deserve is beyond the scope of this introductory article.  Kuhn, 
for example, described community responses to scientific crises that mimic classic 
cognitive dissonance reduction behavior.  Id. at 78-79 (stating that when scientists 
encounter an anomaly that leads to results obverse to those predicted by a traditional 
paradigm, “[t]hey will devise numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications of their 
theory to eliminate any apparent conflict”).  Kuhn’s work also mirrors Festinger’s 
observations about dissonance magnitude when it acknowledges that the greater degree 
of “tension” between more dissimilar paradigms can drive community members to more 
extreme responses, even including willingness “to desert science because of their 
inability to tolerate crisis.”  Id.  Aversion to dissonance was so central to Kuhn’s thesis 
that it spawned the analogous concept of “the essential tension,” which arises when a 
community member must work, at least occasionally, within an established paradigm 
despite the discomforting conflict between that paradigm and an anomaly that it cannot 
explain.  Id.  Even more significantly, Kuhn acknowledged that non-scientists also 
experienced this aversive tension, mentioning specific examples culled from the arts 
community.  Id. at 79 n.2 (citing Frank Barron, The Psychology of Imagination, SCI. 
AM., Sept. 1958, at 151, 160). 
95
 See supra notes 80−81. 
96
 Kuhn, for example, observed that minor dissonances might be accommodated by 
extending a traditional paradigm, by casting the dissonance-causing anomaly in a 
different light, or by simply ignoring the dissonance in the hope that some future 
community will find a way to resolve it.  These responses fit into standard categories of 
dissonance-reduction strategies.  See supra notes 52 & 88. 
97
 Supra note 96.  In a full-blown paradigm shift, some community members typically 
adopt long-term dissonance-reduction strategies like total denial, and the community as a 
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[34] A paradigm shift occurs when high-magnitude dissonance makes it 
impossible to place anomaly-generated cognitions in consonance with the 
traditional paradigm.98  Kuhn notes that in such cases, old and new 
paradigms are not merely different—they are generally 
incommensurable.99  That is, they incorporate assumptions and basic 
definitions so irreconcilable that one cannot even find common 
benchmarks with which to compare them.100  Once this occurs, community 
members are generally left with dissonance-reduction options that permit 
only the adoption of a better-fitting worldview—and the migration to a 
new paradigm.101 
[35] These are the general conditions, long studied and well understood 
from a variety of perspectives, to which the arguments in this article apply.  
Social psychologists and economists, like most scientists, raise an 
eyebrow at theories that are contrived post hoc and are not founded on 
empirical data derived from blind, peer-reviewed studies.102  But the 
 
                                                                                                                         
whole may not shift to a new paradigm until a large portion of the original community 
retires or dies out.  Supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
98
 Supra note 43.  This article will use a shorthand to describe such conflicting 
worldviews as “dissonant paradigms.” 
99
 Supra note 46. 
100
 KUHN, supra note 18, at 149. 
101
 One fact agreed upon by all the theorists discussed in this article is that once a 
disruption has spawned a new (and incommensurable) paradigm, the paradigm shift 
cannot be stopped.  See supra notes 47−51, 64, 67; see also CHRISTENSEN, supra note 20 
(asserting that companies that try to use traditional management techniques to halt the 
progress of disruptive technologies cannot succeed). 
102
 BREHM AND COHEN, supra note 81, at 312−13 (noting that a theory can be confirmed 
by its ability to predict experimental outcomes, but merely showing that it is consistent 
with prior observed phenomena is at best persuasive evidence of its validity, and 
specifically stating that “after [an] experiment is over, anything that occurred can be 
interpreted as dissonance reduction, whether or not it was seen as a possible mode 
beforehand”).  Festinger brings up related concerns before gingerly extending his 
theoretical framework to communities that consist of individuals that experience identical 
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liberties taken here in synthesizing the dissonant-paradigm model are 
hardly unprecedented.  Researchers have long sought and found parallels 
between dissonance and macroeconomic phenomena103 and Kuhn’s 
observations about paradigm shifts have routinely been applied to extra-
scientific communities.104  Although new to the legal world, the rationale 
and methodology that underlie this derivation should be familiar to readers 
grounded in fields like psychology and economics. 
VI.  THE JURISPRUDENCE OF PARADIGMATIC DISSONANCE 
A.  SONY V. UNIVERSAL 
[36] Despite its apparent novelty, the dissonant paradigm model is 
hardly disconnected from mainstream jurisprudential thought.  There is 
little reason that a theory rooted in neoclassical economics and cognitive 
dissonance—doctrines that have been successfully extended to many of 
the social sciences105—would fail to find relevance in an area of the law 
that clearly intersects with macroeconomics and group psychology.106 
 
                                                                                                                         
dissonances.  But his reservations are not daunting enough to stop him from proceeding.  
See FESTINGER, supra note 9, at 234. 
103
 See, e.g., Withrow & Geljon, supra note 34; Mullainathan & Washington, supra 
note 90 (providing a sampling of such studies). 
104
 See, e.g., CHRISTENSEN, supra note 20, at xxv (supplementing the book’s detailed 
analyses of several business-community paradigm shifts with a table listing two dozen 
more); Tim O’Reilly, Open Source Paradigm Shift, http://www.oreillynet.com/ 
pub/a/oreilly/tim/articles/paradigmshift_0504.html (extending the concept of paradigm 
shifts to the computer industry, specifically citing the introduction of the IBM PC as an 
example and predicting a shift to open-source software); John C. Harrison, Do You 
Suffer from Paradigm Paralysis?, http://www.mnsu.edu/comdis/kuster/ 
Infostuttering/Paradigmparalysis.html (describing a new paradigm within which the 
medical community may better understand the phenomenon of stuttering). 
105
 See, e.g., Part III and note 85. 
106
 Macroeconomics is the branch of economics that studies the overall working of a 
national economy.  The Free Dictionary, Definition of Macroeconomics, 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/macroeconomics (last visited Oct. 14, 2009).  Social 
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[37] Consider, for example, a dissonance-informed analysis of the 
Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc.107  There, Universal Studios and Disney Productions, 
which owned copyrights on television shows and feature films broadcast 
by television networks, claimed that Sony contributed to large-scale 
infringement by selling videocassette recorders (VCRs) that let viewers 
“time-shift” (that is, record and store for later viewing) their copyrighted 
content.108 
[38] Commercial-supported over-the-air television was still the 
industry’s dominant business model when the case reached the Supreme 
Court.109  But this paradigm had already been disrupted110 by consumer 
videotape technology that allowed millions of viewers to consume TV 
programming more efficiently by choosing viewing times convenient to 
them.111 
[39] Cast in terms of paradigmatic dissonance, this controversy 
becomes a straightforward contest between shared worldviews on opposite 
sides of a paradigm shift.  As is generally the case, the local legal system 
 
                                                                                                                         
psychology is the branch of human psychology that deals with the behavior of groups and 
the influence of social factors on the individual.  The Free Dictionary, Definition of 
Group Psychology, http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Group+psychology 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2009). 
107
 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
108
 Id. at 421−23. 
109
 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, History of Cable Television, 
http://www.ncta.com/About/About/HistoryofCableTelevision.aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 
2009) (noting that cable and satellite television did not become popular until after 
passage of the 1984 Cable Act). 
110
 VCRs Achieve 30% Market Penetration, DISCOUNT STORE NEWS, Feb. 17, 1986, 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m3092/is_/ai_4138144 (citing a report by the 
Electronic Industries Association’s Consumer Electronics Group that 7.6 million units 
were sold in 1984 alone). 
111
 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 421. 
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at the time held the perspective of the industry’s traditional real-time 
broadcast paradigm.112  The studios thus urged the Court to apply strict 
statutory construction to the Copyright Act.113  Within that paradigm, non-
infringing “fair use” of copyrighted content was limited to a small number 
of enumerated instances subject to a statutory four-part test.114  This short 
list did not include time-shifting entire programs for personal use.115 
[40] Time-shifting disrupted the traditional paradigm by transferring 
temporal control over content consumption from the networks to 
consumers.  This threatened a business model that relied upon carefully 
constructed programming schedules to maximize ratings and advertising 
revenue.116  More alarming to the plaintiffs, the VCR made it easy for 
consumers to share and distribute recorded programs without copyright 
owners’ consent, strip out or fast-forward past commercials, view 
recorded shows multiple times, and otherwise control and manipulate 
content in ways that previously had not been possible.117 
[41] These capabilities spawned cognitions alien to the traditional 
paradigm and led to widespread adoption118 of behavioral norms (that is, 
 
                                                                                                                         
112
 See SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 7, at 143.  See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101−1332 
(2006). 
113
 Justice Blackmun affirmed the plaintiffs’ interpretation in a strongly worded dissent.  
See Sony, 464 U.S. at 457 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  His opinion is an illustration of 
Schmidt’s “material law is king” scenario, wherein adjudicators determine legality 
without considering a new-paradigm community’s motivations and probable responses to 
strict-constructionist remedies.  SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 7, at 143. 
114
 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
115
 See id. (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching . . ., scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of 
copyright.”). 
116
 See Sony, 464 U.S. at 452−53. 
117
 Id. (describing reasons why most of these fears should be found groundless). 
118
 Supra note 110. 
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time-shifting) that did not fall within the plaintiffs’ definition of fair use.  
The home-taping community’s commonality of experience ensured that 
these cognitions and dissonances were a group phenomena.119 
[42] Cognitive dissonance theory teaches that viewers faced with such 
disruptive technology and its aversive consequences would likely try to 
reduce their dissonance by denying to themselves the existence of any 
conflict, by fabricating consonance-restoring cognitions (such as the belief 
that time-shifting is a valid new type of fair use), or by taking steps to 
prevent the creation of cognitions potentially dissonant with the traditional 
paradigm (for example, by refusing to make unauthorized recordings or 
even to own a VCR).120 
[43] Among viewers who could not resist the allure of the VCR, the 
most probable strategy would thus be to devise some rationale for 
deeming time-shifting morally or legally legitimate.  Furthermore, because 
the VCR threatened to disrupt a traditional worldview at a fundamental 
level, these cognitions would have likely been only one component of a 
comprehensive, internally consistent set of behavioral norms, beliefs, and 
assumptions—in other words, an entire paradigm—that better 
accommodated anomalies created by VCR technology.121 
[44] Kuhn, Christensen, and the evolutionary economists agree that it is 
generally futile, and even undesirable, to obstruct a new paradigm that 
more efficiently addresses a disruptive anomaly.122  Here it was too late to 
simply ban the VCR after millions of users had adopted the new time-
shifting paradigm.  But, it would have been equally difficult for a mere 
plurality to endorse unrestricted mass copying of protected content in a 
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 See supra notes 91−97 and accompanying text. 
120
 See supra notes 87−88 and accompanying text.  These responses fall into the general 
categories of dissonance-reduction strategies predicted by Festinger and his followers. 
121
 See supra note 92. 
122
 See supra Part III.A−C and note 45; see also KUHN, supra note 18, at 176. 
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way that might be interpreted as subverting centuries of copyright history 
and tradition. 
[45] The Court ultimately resolved the conflict by adopting the standard 
dissonance-reduction strategy of fabricating a new cognition that 
reconciles disparate paradigms.123  Refusing to hold home taping 
infringement per se, it devised a rationale for extending the “fair use” 
defense to the practice of time-shifting an entire program for non-
commercial use.124  And without an underlying act of direct infringement, 
the traditional legal system could not deem the defendants’ act of selling 
VCRs to be contributory infringement.125 
[46] The Sony Court found support for this position by noting that the 
plaintiffs had been unable to show nontrivial harm and that other content 
providers were uninterested in protecting their content from time-
shifting.126  VCR technology thus offered substantial non-infringing uses 
that would be lost to the public should video recorders be banned—
justification in the Court’s eyes for declaring time-shifting to be a new 
type of fair use.127 
[47] Notwithstanding its inconsistency with precedent, this holding 
supported, through a process of extrapolation, the studios’ contention that 
existing copyright law should be strictly enforced.  The Court effectively 
created a third paradigm that reduced the dissonance between the 
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 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
124
 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984). 
125
 Contributory copyright infringement requires actively inducing, causing, or materially 
contributing to, or providing goods or means necessary to help another party directly 
infringe.  Without direct infringement, there can be no contributory infringement.  See 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 851 (9th ed. 2009). 
126
 Sony, 464 U.S. at 446−47.  The Court observed that, because the plaintiffs owned only 
a minority of copyrighted broadcast content, their competitors had “created a substantial 
market for a paradigmatic non-infringing use of [time-shifting VCRs].”  Id. at 447 n.28. 
127
 Id. at 454. 
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Copyright Act’s infringement rules and the new-paradigm cognition that 
time-shifting is neither morally nor legally wrong.  It allowed the 
paradigm shift generally to run its course, but only so long as time-shifters 
adhered to fair use limits now read into the Copyright Act.128 
[48] In true Kuhnian fashion, unfettered VCR technology eventually 
inspired new, more efficient business models and time-shifting 
technologies that ultimately benefited all parties.129  Not only did the VCR 
help create the enormously profitable movie-rental market, but it also 
benefited the public by paving the way for methods of content delivery 
that would more efficiently and effectively satisfy consumer needs than 
traditional broadcast television.130 
[49] Most significantly, the Court arrived at its holding through 
conventional judicial reasoning,131 demonstrating that established 
jurisprudential standards and methodologies can be fully compatible with 
the dissonant paradigm model. 
 
                                                                                                                         
128
 Even the Sony holding would not save time-shifting technologies that, for example, 
caused material economic harm to content owners and had no other non-infringing uses.  
Id. at 449. 
129
 Examples include the video tape and disc rental industries, personal video recorders 
(such as TiVo products), networked media-streaming appliances, video-on-demand 
applications, and online information-delivery services. 
130
 These included settop and computer-based video-recording, video-on-demand 
services, and DVD and Blu-ray discs.  And while the Sony decision did not, strictly 
speaking, address the legality of videotape rental, it certainly did facilitate the growth of 
the VCR market, without which video rentals might never have become viable. 
131
 Albeit, perhaps, with paradigmatic dissonance lurking as a Holmesian “inarticulate 
major premise.”  See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 
457, 465 (1897) (“Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and 
importance of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious 
judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding.”); see also 
Anne C. Dailey, Holmes and the Romantic Mind, 48 DUKE L.J. 429, 447−56 (1999) 
(describing Holmes’s view of the relationship between “Unconscious Ideas and Legal 
Rules”). 
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B.  DISSONANCE AND MODERN JURISPRUDENTIAL THOUGHT 
[50] It is one thing to use historic court decisions to illustrate a novel 
legal theory, but post hoc analyses neither demonstrate a model’s 
predictive value nor integrate it into an established legal framework.  
Here, however, there is no need to shoehorn paradigmatic dissonance into 
the jurisprudential mainstream.  The model clearly claims common 
provenance with several prominent schools of legal thought.  In particular, 
it shares deep roots in neoclassical economics and belief in the primacy of 
transactional efficiency and unfettered market forces132  with the 
influential Chicago School of the Law and Economics movement.133  One 
might even argue that paradigmatic dissonance merely enhances the Law 
and Economics model with a set of dissonance-cognizant analytical 
tools.134 
[51] Both acknowledge that economic forces set the stage for paradigm 
shifts and that, despite any concomitant disruption, such forces are 
essential components of a healthy, growing economy.  But paradigmatic 
dissonance more completely explains less obvious motivations of 
adversaries entangled in such shifts and better predicts the counterintuitive 
ways parties may react to economically rational remedies.  While 
paradigmatic dissonance fits snugly within the larger framework of the 
Law and Economics model, it introduces additional factors necessary to 
accurately compare relative efficiencies and transaction costs and to 
 
                                                                                                                         
132
 This connection should hardly be surprising since the Law and Economics movement 
generally builds upon the same neoclassical model of economics that underlies 
paradigmatic dissonance.  See supra Part III.B. 
133
 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “Law and Economics” as “[a] discipline advocating 
the economic analysis of the law, whereby legal rules are subjected to a cost-benefit 
analysis to determine whether a change from one legal rule to another will increase or 
decrease allocative efficiency and social wealth.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 963 (9th 
ed. 2009).  Although beyond the scope of this introductory paper, the author suggests that 
the complex relationship between paradigmatic dissonance and the Law and Economics 
school is a topic worthy of further exploration. 
134
 That is, by finding linkage between the principles of neoclassical economics and of 
cognitive dissonance theory. 
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predict the conduct of communities interacting within a transitioning 
market.  
[52] The Chicago School has been criticized for mercilessly applying 
economic criteria to even equitable disputes, a perspective that opponents 
claim ignores the importance of distributive justice.135  Paradigmatic 
dissonance addresses this concern by softening the neoclassical model’s 
stark reliance on market infallibility with Humanist qualifications found in 
cognitive psychology. 
[53] Consider again the Sony decision.  There, the plurality, although 
concerned with preserving the studios’ copyrights, was unwilling to 
criminalize millions of Americans merely because they chose a more 
efficient consumption method.  The Court intrinsically understood the 
futility of trying to suppress a paradigm that had been endorsed by the 
mass market—a tactic that, even if successful, risked opening niches for 
less-efficient and even more disruptive innovations.136  In giving relatively 
free rein to economic natural selection, the Sony decision could not help 
but facilitate efficient business models that would better serve the public 
good. 
 
                                                                                                                         
135
 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-Economics from the Perspective of Critical 
Legal Studies, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 465 
(Peter Newman ed., 1998) (“.The . . .  proposal that courts adopt [efficiency] as the 
criterion of decision between different possible legal rules is a bad idea, practically 
unworkable, incoherent on its own terms, and . . . open to . . . ideological manipulation . . 
. .”). 
136
 This is exactly what happened when the Ninth Circuit shut down the Napster peer-to-
peer music file sharing service.  Rather than save the record industry by eliminating 
unauthorized online file sharing, terminating Napster gave rise to decentralized file 
sharing services that have proven nearly impossible to control.  See A & M Records, Inc. 
v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Jeffrey R. Armstrong, Sony, 
Napster, and Aimster: An Analysis of Dissimilar Application of the Copyright Law to 
Similar Technologies, 13 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 1, 13 (2003); SCHMIDT ET AL., 
supra note 7, at 85−86, 90. 
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[54] Paradigmatic dissonance and the Chicago school share ground in 
other ways.  Richard Posner,137 for example, reveals a Kuhnian 
perspective to Law and Economics theory when he describes how 
evolutionary market forces, not the whims of government or some 
objectively knowable benchmarks, ultimately determine the “truth” of new 
ideas.138 
[55] Like the theorists from whose work the dissonant-paradigm model 
is derived, Posner explains that communities select cognitions (and, by 
analogy to the work of H.L.A. Hart,139 ascribe power to the corresponding 
legal system) when those cognitions better explain observations and 
phenomena that are anomalous to a traditional paradigm: 
 [W]hen we say that an idea (the earth revolves 
around the sun) is correct[,] we mean that all or most of the 
knowledgeable consumers have accepted (“bought”) it.  
(Even in science—the traditional domain of objective 
validity—ideas are discarded not because they are 
demonstrated to be false but because competing ideas give 
better answers to the questions with which the scientists of 
the day are most concerned.)140 
[56] Posner’s statements also echo another tenet of paradigmatic 
dissonance: the impossibility of protecting an established business model 
 
                                                                                                                         
137
 Posner, who sits on the Seventh Circuit and is Senior Lecturer at the University of 
Chicago Law School, has been described as “the most influential and significant theorist 
and advocate of the law and economics approach.”  Richard E. Levy, The Tie that Binds: 
Some Thoughts About the Rule of Law, Law and Economics, Collective Action Theory, 
Reciprocity, and Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 901, 904 
(2008). 
138
 Excepting, of course, “purely deductive propositions such as the Pythagorean 
theorem.”  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 541 (2d ed. 1977). 
139
 Discussed infra note 147. 
140
 POSNER, supra note 138, at 541. 
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by suppressing a more efficient paradigm.141  By corollary, Law and 
Economics, like the dissonant paradigm model, acknowledges that 
government should, whenever possible, resist the urge to shield vested 
interests in heavy-handed ways that interfere with technological progress 
or judge innovations solely by using standards rooted in traditional 
paradigms and legal systems. 
 If competition among ideas is the method by which 
truth is established, the suppression of an idea on the 
ground that it is false is irrational.  An idea is false only if 
rejected in the marketplace, and if rejected there is no 
occasion to suppress it.  For the government to declare an 
idea to be “true” when it has suppressed the competing 
ideas would be comparable to its declaring a brand of beer 
to be the “most popular” brand when the sale of the other 
brands had been suppressed.”142 
[57] Posner further notes that even the venerable “Hand rule” of tort 
law,143 familiar to almost every first-year law student, fits within this 
framework by requiring lawmakers and adjudicators to consider the 
relative effects of their actions on both parties to a dispute.144  A remedy 
that enacts great penalties upon time-shifters without demonstrating 
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 See, e.g., CHRISTENSEN, supra note 20, at 266 (claiming that companies that use 
traditional management techniques to halt the progress of disruptive technologies cannot 
succeed because such practices work only with sustaining technologies.  The “more 
productive route . . . is to understand the natural laws that apply to disruptive 
technologies and to use them to create new markets and new products.”). 
142
 POSNER, supra note 138, at 541−42. 
143
 Id. at 542 (“The courts, [Judge Learned Hand] wrote, must in each case ‘ask whether 
the gravity of the “evil” [i.e., if the instigation succeeds], discounted by its improbability, 
justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.’”). 
144
 Id. at 545−46 (using the example of pornography, where restricting the public display 
of pornography on billboards would have a relatively low cost for pornography 
consumers, but failing to enact such a law would have a much higher cost to the public at 
large; the reverse is true for a law that completely bans pornography). 
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equivalent benefits to content owners would be based upon a biased 
analysis that ignores one side of the economic equation.  This is the lesson 
of Sony; one that is still being relearned to this day. 
[58] One can find connections to paradigmatic dissonance in other 
schools of jurisprudential thought.  H.L.A. Hart,145 for example, tempered 
the austere Austinian view of Positivism146 by identifying “secondary 
rules” that legitimize legal power and define how it is allocated and 
applied in society.  The most basic tenet is the Rule of Recognition, which 
holds that law gains validity, not from intrinsic authority of the sovereign, 
but from the recognition and acceptance of those subject to its power.147  
This concept foreshadows the fundamental principle of paradigmatic 
dissonance that it is a community’s market-driven choices, regardless of 
the efforts of government, that legitimize a local legal system and its 
accompanying paradigm. 
[59] From another perspective, the dissonant-paradigm model may be 
viewed as a straightforward extension of the Sociological school of legal 
thought, which considers differences between social groups on either side 
of a legal controversy.148  Instead of defining law as what the courts or a 
government says it is, both doctrines assume a pragmatic stance that 
 
                                                                                                                         
145
  Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart (1907−92) was a British philosopher and professor of 
jurisprudence at the University of Oxford, where he held the esteemed Regius Chair for 
Jurisprudence from 1952 through 1969.  See Tony Honoré, Legal Philosophy in Oxford, 
http://www.law.ox.ac.uk/jurisprudence/hart.shtml (last visited Oct. 14, 2009). 
146
 Austinian Positivism teaches that legal rules are valid because they are enacted by an 
existing political authority or accepted as binding in a given society, not because they are 
grounded in morality or in natural law.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 978 (9th ed. 
2009) (definition of “legal positivism”). 
147
 NEIL MACCORMICK, H.L.A. HART 33 (2d ed. 2008) (stating that a legal system is valid 
in a particular community only if “the bulk of the inhabitants of [that community agree 
to] comply with the primary rules requiring them to do certain things and omit others”). 
148
 See generally MATHIEU DEFLEM, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: VISIONS OF A SCHOLARLY 
TRADITION (2008) (describing and tracing the history of the Law and Sociology 
movement). 
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strives to balance competing values of adversarial groups that belong to 
different demographic and social classes.149 
[60] These parallels are not merely hand-waving efforts to portray 
synchronicities as correlations; they are evidence that legal models do not 
develop in a vacuum.  The same broadly applicable doctrines that inform 
paradigmatic dissonance could not have helped but influence other major 
schools of jurisprudential thought.  Paradigmatic dissonance is a 
multidisciplinary synthesis of widely accepted theories, not an 
unprecedented leap.  And its unique vantage point is an extension of, 
rather than an alternative to, mainstream legal thought. 
VII.  THE ROLE OF LAWMAKERS AND ADJUDICATORS 
A.  THE ILLUSION OF RATIONALISM 
[61] Paradigmatic dissonance need not be the only modality used to 
analyze controversies that arise during paradigm shifts, but failing to 
consider it can result in an imperfect analysis and unintended 
consequences.150  One problem is that mainstream Rationalist analysis 
may not reveal the underlying motivations of parties on either side of a 
transition.  Rationalism, for example, generally presumes that individuals’ 
responses to external events follow logically from their beliefs—not the 
 
                                                                                                                         
149
 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954) (advocating 
desegregation by citing numerous studies that show detrimental psychological and 
sociological effects on segregated black children). 
150
 See supra note 89 and accompanying text; infra Part VII.C (presenting a brief example 
of the often-unexpected ways that individuals respond to cognitive dissonance). 
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other way around.151  This presumption, however, produces an incomplete 
picture of paradigm-shift dynamics.152 
[62] Rationalist legal analysis also fails to acknowledge fundamental 
characteristics of the shift itself.  In his exhaustive examination of the 
conflicts between the recording industry and the online file-sharing 
community, economist Aernout Schmidt noted that, rather than treating 
the emergence of disruptive entrepreneurial markets as migrations to new 
paradigms, mainstream legal analysis assumes the viewpoint of the “local 
legal system.”153  Such an approach determines legality, but never looks 
under the hood.  It fails to address the questions of why one community 
inexplicably violates the law in an otherwise-stable legal system while 
another clings to economically inefficient business models within that 
established system.154  Because existing laws are likely wedded to 
traditional paradigms, Schmidt argues, Rationalist analysis encourages a 
one-sided perspective that casts disruptive technology and new-paradigm 
communities as villains.155  Furthermore, although mainstream legal 
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 Rationalism assumes that pure reason and logic are the ultimate source of truth.  
Britannica Online Encyclopedia, Rationalism, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/ 
topic/492034/rationalism (last visited Oct. 14, 2009).  Legal analyses that blindly 
embrace this philosophy do not always anticipate counterintuitive dissonance effects that 
arise during paradigm-shift controversies.  See, e.g., infra Part VII.C. 
152
 See Mullainathan & Washington, supra note 90 (“[C]ognitive dissonance suggest[s] . . 
.  that behavior may shape preferences.”). 
153
 See SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 7, at 143. 
154
 Id. at 144.  These issues are also a primary focus of Christensen’s “disruptive 
innovation” thesis.  See generally CHRISTENSEN, supra note 20 (describing how 
established businesses and innovators interact from a market perspective in Part I). 
155
 SCHMIDT ET AL., supra  note 7, at 143−44 (observing that this rule applies generally, 
with disruptive technologies and new-paradigm businesses often declared responsible for 
“major legal and economic problems” arising in areas like “intellectual property law 
enforcement[, and] contract, liability, competition[,] and privacy law”); see also Withrow 
& Geljon, supra note 34 (defining the dissonance effect “Fundamental Attribution Error” 
as occurring when one party blames “the other’s perceived mistakes on some intrinsic 
aspect of that person (e.g., their personality or personal abilities . . .)”). 
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analysis frequently assumes that single-mindedly applying current law 
during a paradigm shift will foster more efficient business models, this 
rarely happens.156 
[63] Another failure of Rationalism is its assumption that more severe 
penalties have greater deterrent effect upon premeditated actions.157  This 
may make sense when perpetrators share values and behavioral norms 
with the local legal system.158  But when disputes arise between 
communities defined by incommensurable paradigms, simply increasing 
penalties that favor one worldview over the other can produce 
counterintuitive results.159  Dissonance theory teaches that the most 
effective way to use punishment to discourage behavior is to inflict the 
mildest possible penalty capable of influencing underlying beliefs.160  
Anything stronger will strengthen those beliefs and make the proscribed 
behavior more attractive.161  Even more problematic, the principle of 
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 SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 7, at 144. 
157
 Rationalists presume that behavior is a logical response to stimuli, and thus, in 
general, deterrents deter, incentives entice, and people act in a rational manner.  See 
Britannica Online Encyclopedia, Rationalism, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/ 
topic/492034/rationalism (last visited Oct. 15, 2009). 
158
 Modern homicide law is generally considered logical and effective when applied to 
perpetrators who hold a paradigm similar to the one upon which the law is founded.  This 
paradigm includes beliefs that killing a person is a punishable act; that premeditated 
killings are worse than those committed in the heat of passion; that both are more 
deserving of punishment than causing an accidental death; and that capital punishment or 
life imprisonment have greater deterrent effect than would a few years in prison.  See 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 1 (1980). 
159
 See, e.g., COOPER, supra note 77, at 19−21 (discussing clinical evidence that 
increasing punishment for proscribed behavior can create dissonance effects that make 
those activities more attractive); id. at 24 (describing a classic experiment where more 
severe punishment inflicted upon children ordered not to play with attractive toys had 
less effect upon the children’s cognition that the toys were desirable). 
160
 Id. at 24. 
161
 Id.; cf. id. at 18−19 (citing BREHM & COHEN, supra note 81, at 73−78 (presenting an 
inverse corollary based on a 1961 experiment where Yale students were paid varying 
amounts of money to write favorable essays about unpopular local police; students paid 
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vicarious dissonance, which states that individuals can experience the 
aversive effect of other people’s dissonant cognitions,162 makes it likely 
that applying an overly harsh remedy to even one community member can 
have undesired effects on the entire group.163 
B.  WHAT THE LAW CAN LEARN FROM PARADIGMATIC DISSONANCE 
1.  LEGAL REMEDIES 
[64] It is beyond the scope of this article to propose hard-edged 
solutions to specific social problems.164  But it is certainly possible to 
suggest general points of departure from which theorists, lawmakers, and 
adjudicators can develop fact-specific analyses and remedies. 
[65] In an unpublished 2003 dissertation, economists Jason Withrow 
and Mark Geljon applied Kuhn’s and Festinger’s models to business and 
management problems, analyzing them as dissonances between 
contrasting worldviews.165  The authors defined three general classes of 
remedies: 
 
                                                                                                                         
the least experienced the greatest changes in attitude toward the police, thereby 
confirming an inverse relationship between the intensity of the external stimulus and its 
effect on dissonance)). 
162
 See id. at 119−23. 
163
 Id.  This principle is illustrated infra in the music-industry example of Part VII.C and 
is extrapolated to the concept of “vicarious hypocrisy” in COOPER, supra note 77, at 
178−80. 
164
 In fact, it is inadvisable to consider such a task without undertaking an exhaustive 
analysis of the facts in each case. 
165
 See Withrow & Geljon, supra note 34. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology  Volume XVI, Issue 1 
39 
(i)  Strategic Approaches that foster the development of 
a third paradigm that is consonant with the 
worldviews of both parties;166 
(ii)  Tactical Solutions that reduce dissonance by 
facilitating the parties’ understanding of each 
other’s worldviews and by encouraging them to 
accept the fact that their conduct is rooted in 
different assumptions and beliefs;167 and 
(iii)  Operational Cures that work to build bridges 
between worldviews when creating a new paradigm 
is not possible.168 
[66] Any combination of these three approaches may give rise to 
effective remedies, but cures must be fashioned with an understanding of 
 
                                                                                                                         
166
 Id.  This is the type of approach taken in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., where the Court’s refusal to regulate home-recording devices facilitated the 
creation of the video-rental industry.  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
464 U.S. 417, 427 (1984). 
167
 Withrow & Geljon, supra note 34.  One such remedy is the record labels’ recent 
decision to sell freely reproducible music online.  Even if the music industry’s paradigm 
does not include its customers’ cognition that they have the right to port purchased music 
to multiple devices at will, this new business model acknowledges that such a cognition 
exists and recognizes that it must be incorporated into its business model.  Likewise, even 
if music-consumers do not hold a cognition that they have the duty to pay for online 
music, the labels’ good-faith offering of unprotected downloads may reduce dissonance 
enough to make these services palatable.  See Daniel Kreps, T.I. Illegal Seizure Ruling 
Postponed, Sony/BMG Goes DRM-Free, Led Zeppelin Bonnaroo Rumors Inaccurate and 
More, ROLLING STONE, Jan. 4, 2008, http://www.rollingstone.com/rockdaily/index. 
php/2008/01/04/ti-illegal-seizure-ruling-postponed-sonybmg-goes-drm-free-led-zeppelin-
roo-rumors-inaccurate-and-more (reporting that holdout Sony/BMG will join the other 
major labels, Amazon.com, and iTunes Plus in licensing unprotected MP3 music files 
through the Internet). 
168
 See Withrow & Geljon, supra note 34 (“Accept differences in paradigms and 
implement smart ways of dealing with them.”); see also, e.g., infra Part VII.B.1.c 
(describing a general class of “bridging” remedies that involve taxing revenues generated 
by one business model to support another). 
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underlying cognitive dissonances and the specific factors that control their 
magnitude.169  This perspective may help explain why regulators have 
traditionally favored certain types of solutions to the problems that attend 
disruptive innovation:170 
(a)  THROW TECHNOLOGY AT TECHNOLOGY 
[67] Regulate the pace of the shift with incentives that favor 
technological controls or innovations that reduce dissonance or make old 
paradigms more economically feasible.171 
(b)  ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
[68] Rather than taking one side, force parties to submit to mediation or 
arbitration.  This approach can reduce aversion to compromise by coercing 
adversaries to adopt otherwise-dissonant cognitions172and can be 
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 See BREHM & COHEN, supra note 81, at 302−06 (summarizing the factors controlling 
dissonance magnitude that had been reported to date). 
170
 This list is by no means exhaustive.  It describes several general classes of remedies 
that boast proven track records, but there are innumerable ways to deal with technology-
based disruption, and each solution must be crafted specifically to serve the facts at hand.  
Readers are encouraged to glean ideas from the scores of examples, observations, and 
findings described in the sources cited here.  See, e.g., id.; COOPER, supra note 77; 
FESTINGER, supra note 9. 
171
 The Ninth Circuit ostensibly attempted such a remedy when it ordered the Napster 
online file sharing service to implement a content-filtering mechanism that would allow it 
to survive so long as it could guarantee its ability to pay the music industry royalties for 
all copyrighted content downloaded from its servers.  This appeared on its face to be an 
incentive to create technology that would allow old- and new-paradigm business models 
to coexist.  But many would argue that it was merely a cynical way to side against 
Napster, which had little chance of developing the perfect technology required by the 
court.  See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(holding that Napster “bears the burden of policing the system within the limits of the 
system”); Record Industry Attacks Napster Filter, BBC NEWS, Mar. 28, 2001, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1246924.stm. 
172
 See COOPER, supra note 77, at 63 (describing how dissonance occurs only when a 
subject undertakes dissonance-causing behavior of her own volition). 
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especially effective during an impasse if one or both parties cannot afford 
to lose face through concession.173 
(c)  TAX THE POOR AND GIVE TO THE RICH 
[69] When disruptive innovation threatens a traditional industry with 
undue hardship, it may be possible to ease the pain by using fees and taxes 
to shift capital.  This solution changes the relative efficiency of the two 
paradigms, giving the besieged industry time to catch its breath without 
unduly suppressing innovation.  It may also reduce both sides’ 
dissonances by creating a bridging mechanism through which each 
acknowledges, supports, and profits from the other’s efforts.174 
(d)  GIVE THE MARKET FREE REIN 
[70] In some cases, the government has simply refused to step in, 
allowing survival-of-the-fittest market forces to exert de facto regulation.  
This may seem harsh, but it was just such a ruling in Sony Corp. of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. that, despite fears that home 
videotaping would devastate the film and television industries, instead 
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 Consider how much healthier the music industry might be today had the A&M v. 
Napster court ordered it to negotiate joint ownership of Napster and work together in 
good faith to transform the site into a legal and profitable downloading service.  
Napster’s founders were clearly amenable to a merger but the labels could not risk 
alienating their old-paradigm business partners, such as CD retailers and distributors, by 
voluntarily undertaking such an effort.  Had they been forced to do so under court order, 
however, they might have been relieved of much of that pressure.  See A&M Records, 
239 F.3d 1004; Linda Himelstein, Napster’s CEO Splits on a Sour Note, 
BUSINESSWEEK.COM, May 14, 2002, http://www.businessweek.com/technology/ 
content/may2002/tc20020514_1069.htm (reporting that co-founder Shawn Fanning and 
Napster CEO Konrad Hilbers resigned in anger with the collapse of a deal to sell the 
service to media giant Bertelsmann). 
174
 Congress adopted this approach when refereeing the anti-piracy debate between the 
music and consumer-electronics industries created by the advent of personal digital 
recording devices.  Its solution was to enact the Audio Home Recording Act, 17 U.S.C. 
§§ 1001−10 (2006), which imposed taxes on digital recorders and media that funded 
compensatory royalties to content publishers.  17 U.S.C. §§ 1001−1010 (2006). 
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gave Hollywood an enormous new revenue stream by facilitating the 
creation of the prerecorded videotape aftermarket.175 
2.  A DOZEN RULES 
[71] Complex social problems require sophisticated solutions that make 
sense from multiple perspectives.  When addressing controversies that 
span incommensurate worldviews, the dissonant-paradigm model, even if 
it is not the only theory employed, can add depth to a legal analysis.176  
This section summarizes a dozen of the more useful principles, some of 
which have been alluded to above, that emerge from the extension of this 
model to real-world controversies. 
(a)  THE HARDER YOU PUSH, THE MORE YOU FAIL 
[72] Cognitive dissonance theory states that deterrents are most 
effective when they inflict the minimal amount of punishment necessary to 
alter undesired behavior.  Greater levels of deterrence actually strengthen 
cognitions that reduce dissonance with the unwanted conduct.177 
(b)  SELL TIME, BUT NOT TOO MUCH 
[73] Sometimes an industry devastated by disruptive innovation might 
have been able to compete had it been allowed more time to react.  In such 
cases, regulators may best serve the public interest with temporary 
measures that merely slow a paradigm shift, rather than try to stop it. 
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 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (refusing to 
acquiesce to the MPAA’s demands that videocassette recorders be banned); see also 
Dave Owen, The Betamax vs VHS Format War, MEDIACOLLEGE.COM, Jan. 8, 2008, 
http://www.mediacollege.com/video/format/compare/betamax-vhs.html. 
176
 See, e.g., supra Part VI.A; infra Part VII.C. 
177
 See supra notes 160−61 and accompanying text. 
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(c)  BALANCE THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 
[74] Regulators’ highest priority should be to facilitate progress.  The 
best way to do this is to ensure that innovative technology is allowed to 
deliver the greatest benefit to the greatest number.178  This goal must, 
however, be tempered by fairness.  It is in the public interest to give 
established industries a fair chance to compete on the new playing field.  
They should neither have the power to crush emerging models arbitrarily 
nor to lock out innovative competitors long enough to steal their ideas.  
But they should be allowed to protect their investments against those who 
would use new technology to plunder their assets. 
(d)  UNDERSTAND THE SCOPE OF THE  
NEED BEFORE TAILORING A CURE 
[75] Evolutionary economist Samuelson’s Neoclassical Synthesis 
theory identified economic urgency as the primary factor controlling how 
aggressively government should intervene during a paradigm shift.179  
Despite the urgings of lobbyists and other special interests, lawmakers 
must consider the imminence and the degree of disruption when deciding 
how quickly and how forcefully to respond.  Aggressive response to 
disruptions that are distant in time can themselves cause disruptive 
consequences.180 
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 A common theme running through the derivation of the dissonant-paradigm model has 
been the crucial role that paradigm shifts play in enabling social, economic, or scientific 
progress.  See, e.g., supra notes 18, 48−49, 55−56, 61, 63, 67 and accompanying text. 
179
 See generally PAUL A. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (enlarged 
ed. 1983) (applying the Solow-Swan model to cases where governments are called upon 
to address the disruptive effects of technological innovation, defining parameters that 
specify the proper degree of governmental intervention in such situations, and asserting 
that governments should consider only the immediacy and urgency of harm caused by the 
disruption when deciding how aggressively to act). 
180
 See infra Part VII.B.2.f. 
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(e)  CRYSTALS AND MUD 
[76] The legal system’s initial response to an emerging paradigm is 
generally to shore up old-paradigm statutes through extension, exception, 
and creative interpretation.  It may not be until volumes of case law and 
statutory tweaking reduce the original statute to all patch and no rubber 
that government is driven to pass comparatively straightforward 
legislation that better accommodates the new paradigm.181  The timing of 
such overhauls can significantly alter the social and economic impact of a 
paradigm shift and the relative fortunes of parties on either side.  If 
enacted too soon, lawmakers may not be able to fully identify the evolving 
paradigm or understand its implications.182  But if too late, obsolete laws 
may be exploited to suppress innovation or remain on the books long after 
they have ceased to serve any purpose. 
(f)  NEW PARADIGMS CANNOT BE ANTICIPATED 
[77] One issue in which theorists from Kuhn through Christensen agree 
is that there is no way to anticipate the nature and implications of a new 
business model, paradigm, or technology before it emerges.  Pre-emptive 
strikes on disruptive innovations that exist only in crystal balls are likely 
to be at best a waste of resources.183  A better strategy is to monitor early-
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 This cyclical model, developed and applied to property law by Stanford professor 
Carol Rose, asserts that statutes begin as hard-edged “crystalline” entities that produce 
deterministic results, but are eventually “muddied” in the courts by exceptions and 
extension to unforeseen fact patterns.  According to Rose, when the muddiness increases 
to an unworkable level, the cycle continues with another round of crystallizing 
legislation.  One can analogize the disruptive effects of technological innovation into 
similar cycles, a phenomenon that may in fact occur generally.  See Carol M. Rose, 
Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 580 (1988). 
182
 See infra Part VII.B.2.f. 
183
 See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 20, at 265 (stating the principle that “Markets That 
Don’t Exist Can’t Be Analyzed,” which holds that a company that refuses to enter a new 
market without first accumulating market data and revenue projections will be 
“paralyzed” by disruptive technologies “because they demand data on markets that don’t 
yet exist.”); see also, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417 (1984) (where the movie industry attempted to convince the courts to ban a 
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warning mechanisms that give regulators and affected communities time 
to forge measured responses to disruption.184 
(g)  REGULATION MUST ACCOUNT FOR THE  
NEEDS OF THOSE BEING REGULATED 
[78] Laws and regulations that do not accommodate, or even 
acknowledge, the needs of the communities they regulate create 
adversarial, economically inefficient, and ultimately anti-democratic 
relationships between the governing and the governed.185  Legal analyses 
and remedies must recognize that when parties violate local statutes.  They 
may be acting in accord with norms that the law will one day recognize.186  
Rationalist solutions that accept the legitimacy of only one party’s 
worldview cannot produce equitable remedies tailored to the needs of both 
sides.187 
(h)  SOMETIMES IT IS BEST TO WAIT AND SEE 
[79] Regulators always must ask themselves whether it makes more 
sense to do nothing than to take steps that could make a bad situation 
 
                                                                                                                         
technology that, not too many years later, spawned a business model that became one of 
Hollywood’s most important revenue sources). 
184
 See CHRISTENSEN, supra note 20, at 143 (“The strategies and plans that managers 
formulate . . . should be plans for learning and discovery rather than plans for 
execution.”). 
185
 Mathias Klang, Disruptive Technology: Effects of Technology Regulation on 
Democracy 225−27 (Oct. 2, 2006) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Göteborg 
University, Dept. of Applied Information Technology), available at http://gupea.ub.gu.se/ 
dspace/handle/2077/9910; see also MACCORMICK, supra note 147. 
186
 Klang, supra note 185, at 226 (stating “[t]he process of legislation and control must . . 
. involve the needs of the users,” and drawing parallels to engineering design standards 
and the requirements of social contracts). 
187
 See SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 7, at 142−43. 
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worse.188  When it is too soon to safely fashion even interim remedies or 
when parties to a controversy may yet be persuaded to negotiate on a level 
playing field, the best solution may be for government to step aside and, at 
least for a time, allow market forces to prevail. 
(i)  BEHAVIOR CAN CHANGE BELIEFS 
[80] Cognitive dissonance theory states that when an individual’s 
behavior is inconsistent with a previously held cognition, the resulting 
dissonance can compel a change in beliefs or assumptions.189  While it 
may be obvious that thoughts can influence behavior, conventional 
analyses would not predict the opposite to be true.190 
(j)  PARADIGM SHIFTS PASS A POINT OF NO RETURN 
[81] Lawmakers can try to cushion the catastrophic effects of a 
paradigm shift on established businesses.  They can throttle its pace 
through regulation, and they can use incentives to temporarily funnel 
innovation in a particular direction.  But they generally cannot 
permanently stop a community from adopting a paradigm that fits its 
needs and cannot hope for a good outcome by merely giving entrenched 
industries the power to suppress innovation.  Economic forces almost 
always prevail.191 
(k)  NOT ALL COGNITIONS ARE CREATED EQUAL 
[82] Dissonance-altering remedies produce unexpected consequences 
when they prompt a different dissonance-reduction response than they had 
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 See, e.g., infra Part VII.C (implying that cognitive dissonance theory reveals that the 
more aggressively the RIAA attacks file sharers, the less likely they are to experience 
aversion to unauthorized copying); COOPER, supra note 77, at 19−21, 24−25. 
189
 See Mullainathan & Washington, supra note 90 (reporting experimental results that 
show that “cognitive dissonance suggest[s] . . . that behavior may shape preferences”). 
190
 See id.; see also BREHM & COHEN, supra note 81, at 73−78. 
191
 See supra note 141. 
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intended.  The factors that influence this critical decision are related to the 
relative importance a person assigns to each cognition.  Those that have 
greater perceived importance generally produce higher magnitude 
dissonance with other cognitions, and the relative importance of 
cognitions in a dissonant pair helps determine which one a subject tries 
harder to preserve.  Furthermore, efforts to modify an individual’s or a 
community’s behavior or beliefs by changing the importance of one 
cognition may have surprising ripple effects on other cognitions and 
dissonances.  Thus, remedies undertaken without knowledge of the issues 
that influence dissonance-reduction choices pose a greater risk of 
unintended consequences. 
[83] Modern dissonance theory, for example, holds that it is generally 
harder to change behavioral cognitions than it is to alter attitudes.192  
Consequently, a remedy that increases the dissonance between a norm of 
conduct and an equally strong belief is more likely to change the subject’s 
thought processes than her behavior.193 
[84] Similarly, when fashioning legal remedies, it is important to realize 
that it is easier to alter cognitions about one’s own behavior, often by 
merely changing the behavior itself, than it is to change cognitions about 
the environment gleaned from one’s own senses.194 
[85] Finally, all things being equal, cognitions that correspond to 
cultural norms are usually stronger (and more difficult to change) than 
personal beliefs.195 
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 See COOPER, supra note 77, at 8 (“In general, it is difficult to change a cognition about 
one’s behavior.  Therefore, when behavior is discrepant from attitudes, the dissonance 
caused thereby is usually reduced by changing one’s attitude.”). 
193
 Id. 
194
 FESTINGER, supra note 9, at 276. 
195
 COOPER, supra note 77, at 182 (“[When choosing between] internalized standards of 
one’s society, culture, or family, or [the] personal standards . . . generated by what one 
thinks of oneself. . . . [T]he playing field . . . tilts toward normative standards unless 
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(l)  VICARIOUS DISSONANCE 
[86] It is possible for individuals to experience dissonance by merely 
observing the undesired consequences of others’ behavior.  This effect, for 
better or worse, leverages the effects of remedies imposed on individuals, 
extending their reach throughout the community.  This can be an effective 
tool when it is not practical to punish or reward the behavior of every 
community member.  But, it can also compound errors when a modest 
remedy produces unintended consequences.196 
C.  UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: A BRIEF EXAMPLE 
[87] The surprising outcomes often predicted by cognitive dissonance 
theory help explain why many seemingly rational, straightforward legal 
remedies produce counterintuitive results.  Dissonance theory can thus 
help governmental and private entities better comprehend and more 
reliably influence individuals’ behavior by more accurately identifying 
and characterizing the components of the paradigm they share.197 
[88] The recording industry, for example, periodically tries to 
discourage unauthorized online file-sharing activity by launching media 
campaigns that stress the inequity of enjoying another person’s creative 
work without compensation.198  Dissonance theory would characterize 
such messages as attempts to reinforce consumers’ presumed belief in fair 
 
                                                                                                                         
something in the environment specifically makes personal standards particularly 
accessible.”). 
196
 See supra note 162 and accompanying text; see also infra Part VII.C. 
197
 See, e.g., COOPER, supra note 77, at 174 (citing public health policy as an example of 
how cognitive dissonance may be “an effective means of inducing changes in both 
behavior and attitudes toward greater compliance with positive health messages” and 
calling it “one [of the] more effective . . . techniques that health professionals can use to 
trigger healthier behaviors”). 
198
 The Record Industry Association of America (RIAA), Motion Picture Association of 
America (MPAA), and the business-software industry’s Business Software Alliance 
(BSA) have all launched such advertising campaigns over the last few decades. 
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play, and thus increase the magnitude of that cognition’s dissonance with, 
and the resulting aversion to, unlawful file-sharing behavior. 
[89] This tactic, however, ignores the fact that file-sharing communities 
live within a different paradigm than do record labels.  It is a mistake to 
assume that young Internet music consumers observe any belief, 
assumption, or norm of behavior merely because such a cognition falls 
within the record industry’s traditional paradigm. 
[90] Music file-sharers, for example, do not equate the interests of 
faceless record labels with those of recording artists.  Many believe that 
money paid to major record labels never finds its way into musicians’ 
pockets and, if anything, assume that record companies routinely and 
shamelessly exploit both musicians and consumers.199  The cognition that 
unlawful downloading deprives labels of income thus does not easily lead 
the file-sharing community to the conclusion that the practice is immoral 
or harmful to innocent parties.  Therefore, pleas to consider the welfare of 
musicians are less likely within the file-sharing community’s paradigm to 
increase the magnitude of the dissonance between downloaders’ online 
behavioral norms and their belief in fair play. 
[91] A better understanding of dissonance and paradigm shifts might 
suggest more effective ways to discourage file-sharing behavior.  One 
strategy would be to cultivate dissonance with the cognition that recording 
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 A representative sampling of Stanford law professor and celebrity file-sharing 
advocate Lawrence Lessig’s online writings clearly express the disdain that the file 
sharing community feels toward the music industry.  See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, 
Copyrights Rule, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, Oct. 2, 2000, http://www.lessig.org/ 
content/standard/0,1902,18964,00.html (“Courts are racing to enjoin alleged violators of 
copyright law, taking no account of the effects on the development of the Internet.”); 
Lawrence Lessig, Copyright Thugs, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, May 7, 2001, 
http://www.lessig.org/content/standard/0,1902,24208,00.html (“[P]reventing piracy 
doesn’t mean you can punish researchers.”); Lawrence Lessig, Just Compensation, THE 
INDUSTRY STANDARD, Apr. 9, 2001, http://www.lessig.org/content/standard/0,1902, 
23401,00.html (“Congress should help artists get paid without delivering the Internet into 
the hands of the big labels.”); Lawrence Lessig, The Limits of Copyright, THE INDUSTRY 
STANDARD, Jun. 19, 2000, http://www.lessig.org/content/standard/0,1902,16071,00.html 
(“You don’t have to be a pirate to be concerned about this trend . . . .”). 
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companies engage in practices so unfair that the labels themselves do not 
deserve equitable treatment.  The labels, however, have done exactly the 
opposite, reinforcing their schoolyard-bully image with high-profile 
lawsuits that threaten small-time music downloaders with extraordinary 
fines.200  As mentioned earlier, dissonance theory teaches that 
unnecessarily harsh penalties have less deterrent effect and can actually 
strengthen cognitions that reinforce undesired behavior.201  Taking steps 
that increase resentment of the music industry promotes the belief that the 
labels do not deserve fair treatment and further reduces cognitive 
dissonance with illicit downloading norms, making the practice even more 
acceptable within the file-sharer community.202 
[92] Apple, Inc., on the other hand, took a radically different approach 
with its iTunes legal music download service, the first such offering that 
could be considered a commercial success.203  Despite the fact that 
Apple’s copy-protection technology was cracked soon after iTunes went 
live,204 there is little evidence that the site has suffered from wholesale 
piracy—at least any that might cause the devastating sales declines that 
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 See Hiatt & Serpick, supra note 23. 
201
 See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
202
 One might argue that the incommensurability of the paradigms in conflict here and 
record executives’ ignorance of the characteristics of paradigm shifts both conspired to 
prevent decision-makers from understanding the futility of attempting to change beliefs 
and norms of behavior with a message rooted in the cognitions of the wrong paradigm.  
Nonetheless, it is hard to argue that the record companies’ lawsuits against music 
consumers helped in any significant way; music sales have taken a precipitous fall since 
the suits began in late 2003.  See Hiatt & Serpick, supra note 23 (including a Nielsen 
SoundScan album sales chart that shows the rate of decline increasing sharply in 2004 
and subsequent years). 
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 See Apple’s iTunes Grows to No. 2 U.S. Music Retailer, REUTERS.COM, Feb. 26, 2008, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/industryNews/idUSWNAS243320080227 (reporting that 
only Wal-Mart sold more music than iTunes in 2007). 
204
 John Borland, Program Points Way to iTunes DRM Hack, CNT NEWS, Nov. 24, 2003, 
http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/internet/11/27/itunes.code.ap/index.html. 
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have crippled the major labels.205  One difference is that young, hip music 
consumers do not view Apple with the contempt they reserve for old-
paradigm record companies.  Apple CEO Steve Jobs has made it clear that 
Apple is one of them, openly challenging the labels’ hardline anti-piracy 
stance206 and furnishing iTunes with a slick interface and savvy business 
model that reveals an understanding of its user community’s shared 
paradigm.207  While music consumers overwhelmingly prefer illicit 
download sites to the labels’ proprietary offerings, a significant minority 
willingly pays Apple for content available elsewhere for free.  In other 
words, Apple has been more successful than the major record labels 
because its business decisions, informed by an intrinsic understanding of 
the online-music community’s shared paradigm, gave rise to cognitions 
and cognitive dissonances critically different from those produced by the 
labels’ old-paradigm tactics. 
[93] This brief example hints at the power of dissonance theory to 
provide an analytical framework within which one can conceptualize 
interactions between communities that share different paradigms.  But it is 
not intended to be definitive proof of the superiority of the dissonant-
paradigm model.  Many of the same conclusions could have been reached 
through other paths and, more to the point, using paradigmatic dissonance 
theory to forge a comprehensive analysis of a complex real-world 
controversy would require a deeper understanding of Festinger’s and 
Kuhn’s work and its linkage to modern jurisprudential thought than can be 
imparted here.  The point is to convey a taste of how the dissonant-
paradigm model might be applied and to demonstrate that such analyses 
are possible, have predictive value, and can produce insights into why 
seemingly logical actions have unanticipated outcomes. 
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 See supra note 203. 
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 Steve Jobs, Thoughts on Music, http://www.apple.com/hotnews/thoughtsonmusic (last 
visited Oct. 15, 2009). 
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 Troy Dreier, Apple iTunes Music Store, PC MAGAZINE.COM, Aug. 5, 2003, 
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VIII.  FINAL THOUGHTS: “WE’VE ONLY JUST BEGUN” 
[94] The dissonant-paradigm model may seem novel within the context 
of legal analysis, but extrapolations of psychological and economic 
theories to foreign disciplines are far from unique.  As noted earlier, the 
work of Kuhn, Christensen, and the evolutionary economists has been 
successfully extended to a broad range of disciplines.  And legal theorists 
have certainly strayed into the social sciences—sometimes even with 
results that seem deceptively similar to the work presented here.208 
[95] Applying Festinger’s theory of cognitive dissonance to the law 
may seem formidable to legal professionals who lack training in 
psychology, but similar efforts have already borne fruit in business 
management, economics, finance, and many other fields of endeavor.209  
There is no reason why the legal profession, with its centuries-long 
academic legacy and huge number of peer-reviewed journals,210 cannot 
develop a useful body of theory and case law in this area. 
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 One must be careful to distinguish the dissonant-paradigm model from the 
superficially similar Behavioral Law and Economics school, which seeks to replace the 
Law and Economics school’s assumption of perfect rationality with the assertion that “all 
people systematically fall prey to biases and errors in their judgment and decisionmaking 
[that] lead to predictably irrational behavior.”  Although the two theories may seem to 
start from the same gate—with the assumption that legal analysis must account for 
behavior motivated by psychological factors—the conclusions and applications are 
dissimilar.  This article makes no judgments about the rationality of the choices made by 
individuals faced with cognitive dissonance, and that issue is irrelevant to the thesis 
presented here.  At most, cognitive dissonance identifies rules with which seemingly 
irrational conduct can be seen to be logical and consistent.  See Gregory Mitchell, Why 
Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and 
Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91GEO. L.J. 67, 67 (2002). 
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applies cognitive psychology, including dissonance theory, to the behavior of financial 
markets); see also the many other examples cited supra in note 90. 
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United States.  Karen Dybis, 100 Best Law Reviews, NAT’L JURIST, Feb. 2008, at 22. 
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[96] It would be impossible to fully explore such an expansive thesis in 
this limited space.  This article attempts to provide no more than an aerial 
view of the dissonant-paradigm model’s logical flow and overarching 
concepts, and strives to do so in terms familiar to a legal audience.  
Numerous opportunities exist for interested readers to flesh out this 
skeletal work and delve more deeply and subtly into the topic from both 
legal and extralegal perspectives. 
[97] In conclusion, we reiterate our position that paradigmatic 
dissonance does not take sides in paradigm-shift controversies and, despite 
some of the examples cited here, should not be condemned out of hand as 
a backhanded effort to justify copyright infringement.  To the contrary, it 
proposes a broader perspective that accommodates the viewpoints of both 
parties to a controversy and acknowledges the fact that new-paradigm 
business models and communities, despite the havoc they wreak on 
established industries, cultures, and legal systems, serve a vital economic 
function.  In other words, we go no further than to hold that such pioneers 
should not be reflexively dismissed as criminals merely because their 
activities defy traditional standards. 
[98] Paradigmatic dissonance brings to the table a new way for the law 
to conceptualize the processes that drive paradigm shifts, a framework 
within which lawmakers and adjudicators can better evaluate responses to 
complex and subtle social problems.  It is the author’s hope that this first 
modest effort be cultivated by many hands into a robust model that can 
better address the often-devastating business, social, and economic 
problems that accompany increasingly frequent technological revolutions. 
